The Economics of Contracts

A Primer

Bernard Salanié

250 pages, parution le 30/04/1997 (2^eme édition)

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Résumé

Although it is one of the major achievements in the history of economic thought, the general equilibrium model is not completely satisfactory as a descriptive tool. In the 1970s several economists settled on a new way to study economic relationships that is often called the "economics of information." The theory of contracts is one of its main building blocks.

The theory of contracts uses partial equilibrium models that take into account the full complexity of strategic interactions between privately informed agents in well-defined institutional settings. The models sum up the constraints imposed by the prevailing institutional setting through a contract, either explicit or implicit. They make intensive use of noncooperative game theory with asymmetric information.

The Economics of Contracts introduces graduate students and nonspecialist professional economists to the theory of contracts. It grew out of a course Professor Salanié gave to third-year Stanford graduate students and third-year students at the Ecole Nationale de la Statistique et de l'Administration Economique. The book focuses on the methods used to analyze the models, but also discusses a few of the many applications the theory has generated in various fields of economics. The author's goal is to give readers the basic tools to create their own applications.

L'auteur - Bernard Salanié

Bernard Salanié est professeur au Département d'Économie de Columbia University ; il a aussi enseigné à Stanford University, à l'Université de Chicago, à l'Ensae et à l'École Polytechnique. Il est l'auteur de Théorie économique de la fiscalité, d'Institutions et emploi (avec Guy Laroque) et de Microéconomie-Les défaillances du marché dans la même collection aux éditions Economica, ainsi que de L'économie sans tabou aux éditions Le Pommier.

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Sommaire

Introduction
Adverse Selection: General Theory
Adverse Selection: Examples and Extensions
Signaling Models
Moral Hazard
The Dynamics of Complete Contracts
Incomplete Contracts
Some Empirical Work
Appendix: Some Noncooperative Game Theory

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Caractéristiques techniques

	PAPIER
Éditeur(s)	The MIT Press
Auteur(s)	Bernard Salanié
Parution	30/04/1997
Édition	2^eme édition
Nb. de pages	250
Format	15,5 x 23,5
Couverture	Relié
Poids	500g
Intérieur	Noir et Blanc
EAN13	9780262193863