Regulation and Development

Jean-Jacques Laffont - Collection Federico Caffè Lectures

268 pages, parution le 16/03/2005

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Résumé

In Regulation and Development Jean-Jacques Laffont provides the first theoretical analysis of regulation of public services for developing countries. He shows how the debate between price-cap regulation and cost of service regulation is affected by the characteristics of less developed countries (LDCs) and offers a positive theory of privatization that stresses the role of corruption. He develops a new theory of regulation with limited enforcement capabilities and discusses the delicate issue of access pricing in view of LDC's specificities. In the final chapter he proposes a theory of separation of powers which reveals one of the many vicious circles of underdevelopment made explicit by the economics of information. Based on organization theory and history, and using simple empirical tests wherever possible, Professor Laffont offers a comprehensive evaluation of the different ways to organize the regulatory institutions and opens up a rich new research agenda for development studies.

L'auteur - Jean-Jacques Laffont

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Sommaire

Publisher's acknowledgment
Foreword
Preface
Introduction
Overview of regulatory issues
The rent extraction-efficiency trade-off
A positive theory of privatization
Enforcement, regulation and development
Access pricing rules for developing countries
Universal service obligations in LCDs
Design of regulatory institutions
Separation of regulatory powers and development
Concluding remarks
References
Index

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Caractéristiques techniques

	PAPIER
Éditeur(s)	Cambridge University Press
Auteur(s)	Jean-Jacques Laffont
Collection	Federico Caffè Lectures
Parution	16/03/2005
Nb. de pages	268
Format	13,5 x 21,5
Couverture	Broché
Poids	407g
Intérieur	Noir et Blanc
EAN13	9780521549486
ISBN13	978-0-521-54948-6